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Put not your trust in money, but put your money in trust.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.

1

I. Introduction
It’s a story heard time and again. A child, once famous, now
broke. Fame, money, and youth equal problems: Michael Jackson, 2
3
4
5
6
Gary Coleman, Macaulay Culkin, Corey Haim, Shirley Temple.

*

J.D. Candidate 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author
would like to thank Lois Schwartz for her guidance in this note.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST-TABLE 54
(1858).
2. E.g., Geoff Boucher & Elaine Woo, Michael Jackson’s Life Was Infused With
TIMES,
June
26,
2009,
Fantasy
and
Tragedy,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/news/obituaries/la-me-jackson-obit262009jun26,0,1970798.story?page=1.
3. E.g., Dennis McLellan, Gary Coleman Dies at 42; Child Star of Hit Sitcom
‘Diff’rent Strokes, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2010), http://www.latimes.com/news/obituaries/lame-gary-coleman-20100529,0,2088052.story.
351
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The list goes on and on: children whose parents forgot that they are
supposed to protect their children—emotionally and financially.
When children earn substantial amounts of money, parents have
something to gain. They frequently manage their children’s money,
and with the desire for personal gain, they face an enormous
temptation to disregard their fiduciary responsibilities. To protect
children against these potential problems caused by their parents, the
California legislature has adopted a statutory scheme known as
7
Coogan Law.
Coogan Law is a popular name for sections 6750 through 6753 of
8
the California Family Code. Before the enactment of Coogan Law,
common law did not help ease the financial tension between parent
9
and child because a minor’s earnings belong to his or her parents.
Children were at the mercy of their parents, who often mismanaged
10
the money earned by their children. As Marc Staenberg and Daniel
Stuart point out, “instances of financial exploitation of child
performers by their own parents cr[ied] out for legislative
11
intervention.”
Coogan Law provides statutory authority designating income
earned by a minor under an entertainment contract as the minor’s
12
property, rather than the property of the minor’s parents. These
13
14
statutes were first enacted in 1939, substantially revised in 2000,

4. E.g., Susie Linfield, Trouble in the House THAT Mac Built: A Custody Battle for
Macaulay Culkin by His Parent-Managers Offers a Glimpse Into What Can Happen in
Hollywood When a Son Is Also a Star, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-05/magazine/tm-64948_1_macaulay-culkin.
5. E.g., Dave Itzkoff, Corey Haim, Actor, Has Died, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/corey-haim-actor-has-died/.
6. E.g., Peter M. Christiano, Saving Shirley Temple: An Attempt to Secure Financial
Futures for Child Performers, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201 (2000).
7. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6750-6753 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg.
Sess. and all propositions on 2012 ballots.)
8. Jordana Lewis, Minor Contracts, Major Issues: Inside the Coogan Act,
OF
TALENT
AGENTS
(Mar.
7,
2007),
ASSOCIATION
http://www.agentassociation.com/frontdoor/news_detail.cfm?id=544.
9. CAL. FAM. CODE § 303 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess. and
all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
10. Christiano, supra note 6, at 205.
11. Marc R. Staenberg & Daniel K. Stuart, Children as Chattels: The Disturbing
Plight of Child Performers, 32 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS’N J. 21, 22-23(Summer/Fall 1997).
12. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500(a) and (c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg.
Sess. and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
13. Lewis, supra note 8.
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and subsequently amended in 2004. 15 But despite these ongoing
efforts to provide financial protection, the adverse interests of parents
and their children persist. The concern that many child entertainers
are not yet adequately protected invites close scrutiny of the law to
assess whether changes are still required to assure children in the
entertainment business have optimal protection.
This note examines the current Coogan Law and proposes
changes to afford greater protection to children working under
entertainment contracts. Part II of this note explains the history of
Coogan Law from its inception to its most recent revision. Part III
examines the current law and its loopholes: (1) the problems
associated with court-approval; (2) the inadequacy of the fifteen
percent requirement; (3) the inherent problems with parents as
trustees; and (4) the statutory termination of the trust at the age of
majority. Finally, part IV of this note proposes changes to the
existing laws, aimed at curtailing each of the problems above and
ultimately increasing the financial protection available to children
working as performers in the entertainment industry.

II. Background
A. A History of Coogan Law

In 1919, Charlie Chaplin discovered a child actor by the name of
16
Jackie Coogan. Chaplin chose Coogan to play opposite him in his
famous film, The Kid (1921), laying the foundation for Coogan’s
17
successful career and fame. In 1923, at the age of nine, Coogan was
18
one of the highest paid actors in Hollywood. But when he turned
twenty-one in 1935 and asked his mother for his earnings, he learned
19
that his hard-earned money was gone. The reasons underlying
Coogan’s fame shifted when he notoriously sued his mother in an
20
effort to recover his earnings. In 1939, his litigation prompted the
14. Amanda Bronstad, Coogan Law Loophole Leaves Child Actors at Financial Risk,
THE
NAT’L
LAW
JOURNAL
(Apr.
18,
2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202490167503.
15. Ben Davis, Comment, A Matter of Trust for Rising Stars: Protecting Minor’s
Earnings in California and New York, 27 J. JUV. L. 69, 74 (2006).
16. Coogan Law, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, http://www.sag.org/content/coogan-law
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
17. Id.
18. Jackie Coogan, IMDB.COM, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001067/bio (last
visited Jan. 17, 2012).
19. SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, supra note 16.
20. Id.
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enactment of what is referred to as Coogan Law: the California state
legislature’s attempt to help protect child entertainers’ earnings from
21
their parents.
Children’s earnings have to be protected for a number of reasons.
Traditionally, contracts entered into by a minor are subject to
disaffirmance if the contracting minor elects to do so before reaching
22
the age of majority or shortly thereafter. In 1872, long before the
1939 statutes went into effect, the California state legislature enacted
23
sections 35 and 36 of the Civil Code “to protect employers from the
24
common law and statutory rights of minors to disaffirm contracts.”
These statutes did not protect minors but rather revoked the limited
25
protection a child did have in most circumstances.
Under these early statutes, minors could still disaffirm a contract
under which they earned more money than needed to financially
26
support themselves. Thus, the film industry wanted a way to protect
27
In 1927, the
itself from minors disaffirming their contracts.
California state legislature amended section 36, specifically revoking
a minor’s right to disaffirm entertainment contracts if the contract
28
had been court-approved. This statute provided some protection to
29
minors working under contracts that had not been court-approved,
but it failed to provide protection because the legislation did not
specify criteria for judges to apply when deciding whether to grant
30
approval to contracts submitted to the court for approval. Thus, the
statutes gave some protection to movie producers, but did little to
31
protect the children.
Enter Jackie Coogan, circa 1939. Coogan’s famous lawsuit
32
The
against his mother exposed the inadequacies of the law.
California legislature responded to public concern by changing the

21. Id.
22. Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11, at 24 (explaining rationale behind the right to
disaffirmance is to protect children from exploitation and public policy of “‘protect[ing]
minors from their own improvidence’”).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 35 and 36 repealed by Statutes 1993, ch. 219 §2 (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on 2012 ballots..
24. Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 25.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. See Bronstad, supra note 14.
32. Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11, at 25.
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law to allow the court to use its discretion to set aside a percentage of
33
the net earnings of a child in a trust account. The child’s parent was
required to establish a trust and provide the information about the
trust to movie producers, who were then required to deposit a portion
34
of the child’s earnings into the trust. This new law became known as
Coogan Law, but because it was filled with loopholes, it still failed to
35
provide child-entertainers with adequate protection.
Despite this modification requiring establishment of a trust
account, most children’s earnings continued to go largely
36
unprotected. One of the most notable loopholes in the original law
was that it only afforded protection to contracts that were “court37
approved” and very few contracts were. Many contracts involving
38
children were never brought before the court for approval. This was
because producers often didn’t seek court approval for contracts for
39
short-term projects “such as a single film or commercial.” Another
notable loophole was the fact that the law’s protection extended to a
percentage of a child’s “net earnings,” with “net earnings” defined as
“the income of the child, less taxes, support and care, expenses
40
associated with the contract, and manager’s and attorney’s fees.”
This allowed parents to drain the income before it could be
41
protected. Yet another loophole included the fact that the amount
of income set aside was a “discretionary” percentage determined by
42
judicial discretion rather than by a fixed proportion. Moreover,
despite the new law, parents still had a right to the income earned by
43
their minor children. The law, as enacted, did not clarify ownership
of the child’s earnings.
Even though the law afforded very little protection, it remained in
effect for more than half a century. The only change was in 1992,
when it was transferred from the California Civil Code to the newly
33. Christiano, supra note 6, at 203.
34. Id. at 207.
35. See generally id. (explaining prominent loopholes in the law included that ninetyfive percent of contracts were not court approved, the decision to establish trusts was left
to the judge, and the continued parental control over substantial amounts of child’s
income).
36. See Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11, at 25.
37. See id.
38. Christiano, supra note 6, at 204.
39. See Davis, supra note 15, at 72.
40. Christiano, supra note 6, at 203.
41. Id. at 205.
42. Bronstad, supra note 14.
43. FAM. § 7500
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enacted Family Code. 44 In 2000, the state legislature finally revised
45
the law in an attempt to correct its many loopholes. The legislature
46
made further revisions to remedy these loopholes again in 2004.
B. The Current Law

The law currently in effect has been more successful at protecting
47
minors’ financial assets than any of its previous versions. The law
applies to contracts “pursuant to which a minor is employed or agrees
to render artistic or creative services . . . . [which] include[s] . . .
services as an actor, actress, dancer, musician, comedian, singer”
48
etc., and to contracts in which a minor is employed to participate in a
49
sport. As in the earlier versions of Coogan Law, a minor cannot
disaffirm a contract as long as the court in the county of the minor’s
50
residence has approved the contract. While a contract is still subject
to disaffirmance if the court has not approved it, commentators have
pointed out that under the new law, the earnings under the contract
are subject to statutory protection regardless of whether the contract
51
has been court approved. Thus, the law finally favors children over
movie producers.
Other changes also aim to provide greater financial protection for
minors. While children’s earnings under all other contracts legally
52
belong to their parents, the revised Coogan Law provides that
children’s earnings under Coogan contracts are property that belong
53
solely to the minor. Whereas earnings that were previously placed
in trust were subject to a discretionary percentage, the current law
requires that no less than fifteen percent of the child’s earnings be set
54
aside in trust. Moreover, the revised law bases that percentage on

44. Christiano, supra note 6, at 203.
45. Bronstad, supra note 14.
MINOR
CONSIDERATION,
46. New
Coogan
Rules,
A
http://www.minorcon.org/cooganupdate.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
47. See Bronstad, supra note 14.
48. FAM. § 6750(a)(1).
49. FAM. § 6750(a)(3)
50. FAM. § 6751.
51. Erica Siegel, When Parental Influence Goes Too Far: The Need for Adequate
Protection of Child Entertainers and Athletes, 18 CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427, 434–35
(2000).
52. FAM. § 7500(a).
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess. and
all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
54. FAM. § 6752.
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gross earnings rather than net earnings. 55 The law defines gross
earnings as “the total compensation payable to the minor under the
56
contract.”
The current law additionally requires that when the minor begins
57
employment, the trustee is required to provide the trust account
58
information to the child’s employer. The employer is then required
to deposit the mandated fifteen percent of the minor’s gross earnings
59
directly into the fund for the duration of the child’s employment.
Once the employer deposits the funds, he or she “shall have no
60
further obligation or duty to monitor or account for the funds.” The
funds can only be reached by the minor beneficiary upon reaching the
61
age of majority, or by the child’s parent or guardian in a petition to
62
the court showing good cause to amend or terminate the trust.

III. Analysis
Despite the relatively recent revisions to California’s Coogan
Law, there are still several loopholes that diminish the protection
afforded to children working in the entertainment industry. These
problems include: (1) the application to employment contracts (and
very rare application to contracts entered into by minors for related
63
services); (2) lack of statutory protections to ensure that a child is
protected from his or her parent(s) spending the eighty-five percent
64
65
of earnings not in trust; (3) the designation of parents as trustees,
which creates an inherent conflict of interest; and (4) allowing trust
assets to be reached by the minor beneficiary immediately upon
66
reaching the age of majority.
Thus, although California’s Coogan Law has made substantial
progress in protecting its child entertainers from financial abuse, the
current law should be improved to better protect children. Even

55. Id.
56. FAM. § 6750.
57. FAM. § 6752 (statutorily designates the minor’s parent or legal guardian as
trustee).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. FAM. § 6753.
62. FAM. § 6752.
63. See Lewis, supra note 8.
64. See Bronstad, supra note 14.
65. FAM. § 6752.
66. FAM. § 6753.
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though California currently requires employers and parents or
guardians of children working under entertainment contracts to
comply with Coogan Law, the law is inadequate to fully protect their
financial interests, and therefore must be further revised to ensure
better protection.
A. The Limited Scope of “Court Approval”

The first problem with the current law is the limitation inherent in
contracts subject to court approval.
Minors cannot disaffirm
67
This is problematic
contracts that have been court-approved.
68
because most contracts are not court-approved. Specifically, “the
Coogan Act does not apply to agency or management contracts in
69
which the minor pays fees in exchange for services.” The law
70
specifically makes employment contracts eligible for court approval,
and does nothing to ensure that contracts entered into by the minor
for related services are eligible for court approval—and thus
71
protected against disaffirmance by the minor. The California Labor
Code does afford some protection to these contracts by making them
subject to court approval if the contracting party is licensed under the
72
73
Talent Agencies Act, but this requirement often is not met. This
loophole encourages parties contracting with minors for services to
contract with their parents or guardians instead, which creates a
conflict of interest between parents, who are parties to contracts for
professional services provided for their children, and the children who
74
are recipients of those services.
In the recent case of Berg v. Traylor, 75 the mother of a minor
signed an agreement for personal management services for her son,
76
an actor. The minor did not sign the agreement, but his mother
77
wrote his name on the contract. The agreement expressly provided
67. FAM. § 6751.
68. Bronstad, supra note 14.
69. Lewis, supra note 8.
70. FAM. § 6750 (Coogan statutes apply to a “contract pursuant to which a minor is
employed or agrees to render artistic or creative services, either directly or through a third
party”) (emphasis added).
71. See Berg v. Traylor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Ct. App. 2007).
72. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.37 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
73. See Lewis, supra note 8.
74. See generally id.
75. 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140 (Ct. App. 2007)
76. Id. at 142.
77. Id.
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that if the minor attempted to disaffirm the contract, his mother, a
78
party to the contract, would be liable. With the agreement still in
79
effect, the mother sent a letter to the manager to cancel the contract.
The parties subsequently entered arbitration and the manager was
80
awarded damages from the minor defendant. The minor filed a
petition to vacate the arbitration award on the basis of his statutory
81
right to disaffirm the original agreement and the arbitration award.
The manager argued that the contract should not be subject to
82
disaffirmance by the minor because his mother signed the contract.
The court, however, held that the child was permitted to disaffirm the
agreement and the resulting arbitration agreement, but his mother
83
remained liable for the arbitration award under the agreement.
The contract involved in Berg v. Traylor was a contract for
services. The very fact that the minor’s contract was not an
employment contract, but a contract for related services, exemplifies a
significant loophole in the current law. As the court explained, “[i]t
was therefore not in [the mother’s] interest to have [her son] disaffirm
the agreement because [the manager] would look to her, personally,
for satisfaction of [the child’s] obligations under the agreement. As
such, [the mother’s] interests in the lawsuit were in direct conflict with
84
those of her son’s.” Because her minor son disaffirmed the contract,
85
Thus,
the mother was responsible for the resulting damages.
California’s statutory omission concerning court approval for
contracts entered into by minors for fees in exchange for
professionally related services is inherently flawed.
Although
protected from recourse by the contracting party, the minor child is
hardly in a better position because he is left in a position directly
opposed to his parent’s interest.
B. The Fifteen Percent Problem

While the statutory deposit requirement of fifteen percent of a
minor’s earnings is significantly better than the previous discretionary
rule, it is not enough to ensure adequate financial protection. Section
6752 of the California Family Code requires the minor’s employer to
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. .
Id.
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 146.
Id. at149–50.
Id. at 149.
Id.
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set aside fifteen percent of a child’s gross earnings into the child’s
86
trust account, but it does not specify any restrictions regarding the
87
Despite being property legally
remaining eighty-five percent.
belonging to the child, if the child’s parents do not choose to put the
remaining money in trust, this remaining part of the minor’s earnings
88
is not protected.
A child working in entertainment usually requires the aid of
89
professional services. The American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists lists: “agents, managers, attorneys, acting lessons,
professional photographs, transportation costs, tutoring, publicists
and accountants,” among the operating expenses of a child
90
performer. While it is difficult to argue that these services are not
costly, it is also difficult to argue that eighty-five percent of a minor’s
income is required for their payment. But how much money should
be required to be set aside in trust?
A related question is whether, or to what degree, parents should
be compensated for their time and work done in furtherance of their
child’s career. Parents are often required to be with their minor
91
children when the children are working. The child’s employer,
92
however, does not compensate parents for their time. Not only are
parents not compensated, but they also often sacrifice their own
careers and income to help their child pursue a career. This creates a
disproportionate problem in low-income families where a child’s
parent or guardian cannot support the child’s career unless the parent
is entitled to rely on income for his or her investment of time and
93
Thus, the requirement of fifteen percent needs to be
labor.
increased and steps need to be taken to decrease the parents’
incentives to invade their children’s earnings as compensation for
their own efforts.

86. FAM. § 6752.
87. Id.
88. Bronstad, supra note 14.
89. See CALIFORNIA “COOGAN” LAW, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TELEVISION
AND RADIO ARTISTS (AFTRA) (Jul. 18, 2009), http://www.sagaftra.org/content/cooganlaw-full-text.
90. Id.
91. Davis, supra note 15, at 79.
92. Id. at 80.
93. Christiano, supra note 6, at 209.
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C. Trusting Parents with Management of Trust Assets

One of the biggest problems in California’s current Coogan Law
is inherent in the trust relationship. As beneficiaries of the trust,
minor children lack the ability to protect themselves from their parent
94
trustees. Every trust requires a valid purpose, property to be held in
95
96
97
trust, and a beneficiary. A trust also requires a trustee. California
98
trust law copies common law, and a trustee is not initially required
to form a valid trust because the court can easily designate an outside
99
trustee. The court’s power to designate a trustee is not limited to
100
A court can appoint a trustee
cases where there is no trustee.
101
whenever the circumstances of a case require intervention.
Despite this well-established principle, Coogan Law requires that
“at least one parent or legal guardian . . . entitled to physical custody,
care, and control of the minor . . . be appointed as trustee of the
102
This statutory appointment is intrinsically problematic
funds.”
because Coogan Law is designed to protect children against parents
who squander their assets, yet those very parents are designated as
trustees with the duty to protect their children’s assets by careful
103
management. The law, however, does make an exception to the
parental appointment if “the court shall determine that appointment
of a different individual . . . as trustee . . . is required in the best
104
interest of the minor.” This exception to the law is intended to help
solve the problem, but it is ineffective because often a minor child is
not in the position to take his or her parents to court to petition for
105
court protection.
94. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15203 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
95. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15202 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
96. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15205 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
97. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15660 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
98. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15002 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012 Reg. Sess.
and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
99. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 302 (2011).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. FAM. § 6752.
103. See generally Thom Hardin, The Regulation of Minor’s Entertainment Contracts:
Effective California Law or Hollywood Grandeur, 19 J. JUV L. 376, 384 (1998) (N.B.
article was written before the 2000 revisions to the law).
104. FAM. § 6752.
105. Bronstad, supra note 14.
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In her article on children working under entertainment contracts,
Erica Siegel alludes to the fact that babies are particularly subject to
financial abuse in the entertainment industry from parents who are all
106
too eager to have them working from days after birth. In the recent
case of Suleman v. Superior Court, a stranger to the now infamous
“Octomom” and her octuplets filed a petition seeking appointment of
107
a guardian to the “Octomom’s” newborn children’s estates under a
California law that allows a “relative or other person on behalf of the
minor” to file a petition for the appointment of a guardian of a person
108
The stranger was Paul Peterson, 109 the
or estate of a minor.
110
president of A Minor Consideration. The court in that case found
Petersen’s effort seeking appointment of a guardian “unprecedented”
111
and “meritless” and held that the “other person on behalf of the
minor” is “a person who pleads ultimate facts demonstrating financial
misconduct or alleges other information sufficient to warrant court
intervention in the management of the minor’s money or other
112
property.”
In Suleman, the petitioner was the leader of an organization
specifically dedicated to protecting the financial interests of minors
working in entertainment. Despite this, the court held that he did not
have the necessary information to remove the infants’ mother as the
113
The court set a difficult hurdle to
guardian of their estates.
overcome, however, by requiring that the “other person on behalf of
the minor” must be someone who “pleads ultimate facts
114
With this difficult
demonstrating financial misconduct.”
requirement, how are children, particularly infants, ever to be
protected from their parents? This judicial standard is too stringent
to allow someone who is not the child’s parent or guardian to
successfully petition the court to appoint a third party guardian.

106. Siegel, supra note 51, at 451–52.
107. 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651, 653-54 (Ct. App. 2010).
108. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510(a) and (b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 876 of 2012
Reg. Sess. and all propositions on 2012 ballots.).
109. Suleman, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654.
110. A Minor Consideration is a nonprofit corporation formed by Petersen to help
safeguard the financial interests of children working in the entertainment industry. A
MINOR CONSIDERATION, www.minorcon.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
111. 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 654.
112. Id. at 660.(emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 662–63.
114. Id. at 660.
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The depth of this problem is illustrated more fully in Berg v.
115
Traylor where a guardian ad litem should have been, but was not
appointed to represent the minor child during arbitration and
116
litigation. The court expressed its dismay at the failure of so many
officers of the court and the court to protect the minor child’s
interests:
Where our difficulty lies is in understanding how counsel, the
arbitrator and the trial court repeatedly and systematically
ignored Craig’s interests in this matter. From the time Meshiel
signed the agreement, her interests were not aligned with
Craig’s. That no one—counsel, the arbitrator or the trial
court—recognized this conflict and sought appointment of a
117
guardian ad litem for Craig is nothing short of stunning.
118
In contrast to Suleman v. Superior Court, where the petitioner
was a third party without the required “ultimate facts demonstrating
119
financial misconduct,” there were several parties in Berg, including
the court, who had direct responsibilities to ensure that the minor
120
child’s interests were protected.
The child’s interests in Berg,
however, were ignored.
Thus, the current law under which a child’s parent is that child’s
guardian and trustee “unless the court shall determine that
appointment of a different individual as guardian ad litem is required
121
in the best interests of the minor,” is ineffective at protecting the
very citizens it is supposed to protect.

D. Trust Termination

The fourth and final problem with the current state of the law is
that the law allows the trust beneficiary, the minor child, to access the
trust holdings as soon as he or she turns eighteen. 122 This is
problematic for two reasons. The first is that once the child comes
into possession of the trust assets, creditors can go after the money in

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Berg, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 140.
Id. at 144.
Id at144–45.
103 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651.
Id. at 660.
Berg, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 140.
FAM. § 6751.
FAM. § 6752.
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satisfaction of any outstanding claims from contracts entered into by
the child’s parent(s) or guardian(s) on behalf of the child during his or
123
her minority.
The second problem is that Coogan Law trusts are established to
protect a child’s earnings from their parents so that their earnings are
preserved upon reaching the age of majority. Even if creditors do not
go after the minor’s assets once the minor is in possession of them,
the trust assets are susceptible to loss by the beneficiary’s own
spending upon reaching the age of majority. The earnings of the child
are compromised because the child-turned-adult has access to all the
earnings upon the age of eighteen. This situation is best viewed in
light of the common law argument favoring a minor’s ability to
124
disaffirm contracts entered into while a minor. Just as a child is
subject to improvidence when he has not yet attained the age of
majority, a child attaining the age of majority is subject to that same
improvidence. The fact that a minor child has access to all of his or
her funds in trust upon the age of eighteen defeats the purpose of
protecting the child from not having the earnings as a young adult.

IV. Proposal
Although Coogan Law has come a long way since its inception, it
must be further improved to provide children working under
entertainment contracts with better financial protection. While the
2004 revision to the law made all employment contracts subject to
Coogan Law without the need for court approval, other contracts
related to minors’ employment, such as contracts for agent and
management services, should also be subject to Coogan Law without
the stringent requirement of court approval. This would go a long
way to ensuring that the interests of children and their parents are not
opposed to one another if minors should try to raise their right to
disaffirmance.
The statutory requirement placing fifteen percent of a child’s
gross earnings in trust is insufficient and should be increased to better
protect children’s financial assets. However, it is unreasonable to set
aside everything a child earns until he reaches majority. Working in
the entertainment industry does require a minor to incur expenses for
related services. In his assessment of the problem, Ben Davis

123. See Bronstad, supra note 14 (pointing out case in which parents had failed to pay
income taxes on child’s earnings and her trust assets were wiped out upon attaining age
eighteen).
124. Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11, at 24.
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suggests that both California and New York should increase the
125
statutory requirement to twenty-five percent.
Furthermore, an
incremental formula for the required trust deposit based on the
amount of the minor’s earnings woul be preferable because children,
especially those working in entertainment, are so susceptible to
financial abuse.
In addition to increasing the statutory trust funding requirements,
rules should be made for an income designation for the child’s parent
126
or guardian. With the current law, a parent or guardian is free to
spend the performer’s earnings that are not set aside in trust and is
likely to do so if there is no other means of earning a living while
127
Statutorily
making every effort to further their child’s career.
designating a capped percentage of a child’s income to be paid to the
parent or guardian could help this situation, alleviating the conflict of
128
interests between children and parents. “Their parents would be
compensated for their time and effort, but could not be unjustly
enriched at their child’s expense by squandering their child’s
129
earnings.” Moreover, such a designation would actually align the
interests of children with those of their parents because parental
income would be based upon the child’s earnings.
Appointing parents or guardians as the trustees of their children’s
trust funds is complicated. On the one hand, they are likely to be in
the best and most efficient position to manage their children’s money
without having to involve a third party. On the other hand, it is too
easy for their interests to become directly adverse to the interests of
the children. One proposal is to follow the example set by the state
legislature in New York. In 2004, New York implemented new
legislation aimed at solving the problem when a parent or guardian
130
acts as trustee to their child’s account. New York law continues to
allow the child’s parent or guardian to act as the custodian of his or
her child’s trust account, but a trust company must be appointed as
131
custodian of the account once it reaches $250,000.

125. Davis, supra note 15, at 80.
126. See Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11, at 31. (Arguing that parental
compensation would enable parents to be “compensated for their time and effort, but
could not be unjustly enriched at their child’s expense by squandering their child’s
earnings.”).
127. See Bronstad, supra note 14.
128. See Staenberg & Stuart, supra note 11, at 31.
129. Id.
130. Davis, supra note 15, at 78.
131. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS Law § 7-7.1 (McKinney 2004).
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The purpose of Coogan Law is to protect the financial assets of
minors employed in entertainment. If their assets can be reached the
132
moment they turn eighteen, the very purpose of the law is defeated.
The law should extend the public policy rationale of “improvidence”
that allows minors to disaffirm contracts to include restrictions on
Coogan Law trust accounts that increase the age of termination,
unless the child, upon reaching the age of majority, has compelling
reasons for terminating the trust early. Additionally, the law should
also ensure that creditors could not reach the child’s assets upon the
trust’s termination.
In the context of professional sports, Susan McAleavey suggests
an alternative to the NBA age rule, arguing that the spendthrift trust
is an alternative way to protect against the naiveté of an NBA player
133
“The trustee . . . manages and invests the
who is a young adult.
principle in a manner that provides for a continuous income flow to
the player. This allocation removes the stress on the player of
managing his own finances and prevents an accountant or family
134
member from manipulating the player and his earnings.” Adapting
McAleavey’s suggestion to fit the needs of other child entertainers,
spendthrift provisions on Coogan Law trust accounts would help
protect children from creditors reaching their assets. Moreover,
increasing the age at which the minor may access the funds is another
strategy that would work to provide greater protection for minors’
earnings. Creditors would then be unable to reach the trust assets
upon the minor reaching the age of majority, and minors would be
protected from foolishly spending all their assets immediately upon
reaching the age of majority.

V. Conclusion
Children are some of the most-susceptible to individuals’ abuse in
the context of trust management. Those working in the public eye
are no less susceptible. Thus, children working in entertainment need
the best protection our legal system can provide. The current law
offers some protection, but there is room for improvement.
California legislators need to take a closer look at the California
Coogan Law and make some additional changes to ensure children
are receiving the most effective financial protection possible.

132. See e.g., Lewis, supra note 8.
133. Susan McAleavey, Note, Spendthrift Trust: An Alternative to the NBA Age Rule,
84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 279, 301 (Winter 2010).
134. Id.

